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(L. A. No. 18735. In Bank.

[24 C.2d

Aug. 31, 1944.]

II AZEL FAIRCHILD et al., Respondents, v. ROSS H.
RAINES et al., Appellants.
[1] Covenants _ Restrictions-Actions-Findings.-In an action
to enjoin violation of an agreement between certain owners
of noncontiguous lots in a tract to restrict use of their property to persons of the Caucasian race for a limited period of
time, it was error not to make findings on a defense, sustained
by evidence, that since the making of the agreement much of
the surrounding neighborhood, including u~estricted lots in
the tract itself, had been occupied by non-Caucasians.
[2] Id._Restrictions-Actions-Injunction.-The granting of an
injanction aga.inst violation of an agreement imposing racial
restrictions on certain noncontiguous lots of a tract rests in
the dilScretiun of the trial court, in the exercise of which the
court may consider the proportion of lots subject to restrictiuns, the occupuncy of adjoining property, and the length of
time the rcstrictions are to endure.
[3] Equity-Relief-Discretion.-The granting or withholding· of
equitable relief involves the exercise of judicial discretion.
[4] Covenants - Restrictions - Actions - Injunction.-The fact
that ther", has been no non-Caucasian occupancy of lots incluued in an agreement of certain lot owners in a tract as
to the character of occupancy is not controlling on the question of the right to an injunction against violation of the
agreement in respect to a particular lot.
[5] Id._Restrietions-Actions-Injunction.-Restrictions against
nOll-Cuu€'asian occupancy of lots in a tract may be enforced
in a proper case, although all the lots in the tract are not
subject to the coven.ant.
[6] Id._Restrictions-Actions-Findings.-In an action to enjoin violation of an agreement as to non-Caucasian occupancy
of certain lots, a finding as to increase of non-Caucasian ocellpancy near or in the vicinity of such lots, and the absence
of change in occupancy as to any of the lots except in the
[1] nange of neighborhood as affecting enforcement of restrictive <:(JV('lwnts, note, 54 A.L.R. 812, 85 A.L.R. 985, 103 A.L.R. 734.
8".', also, Y Cal.Jur. 367; 14 Am.Jur. 646.
McK. :::>ig. References: [1,6] Covenants, § 112; [2,4,5] Covenants, § 104; [3] Equity, § 19; [7] Trial, § 328.
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instance complained of, was inadequate in view. of the spcci.9c;y
allegations of a special defense as to change in conditions and
of the evidence in support thereof.
[7] 'Trial-:-Findings-Probative Facts.-The rule as to the non-,.·
necessity of findings on evidentiary matters when essential
ultimate facts are found, does not apply in an equity suit
where probative facts which are material to the exercise 'of'
judicial discretion and may suffice to constitute' a defense,'
are pleaded and supported by evidence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frank C. Collier, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enJom defendant negroes from using and occupying real property, and to enjoin other defendants from
permitting said negroes to occupy the property. Judgment
for plaintiffs reversed.
Lester V. Peterman for Appellants.
Willis O. Tyler, Loren Miller, George E. Cryer and R. Alston Jones as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
McEachern & Ritchie for Respondents.
Hahn & Hahn and Lindstrom & Bartlett as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Defendants have appealed from a judg,.
ment rendered by the court sitting without a jury, by which
defendants Ross H. Raines and Helen Louise Raines (who are
colored Americans) are "enjoined and restrained from using,
occupying or residing prior to the 1st day of January, 1950,
upon . . . Lot No. 43 of the Palisades Tract in the [City
of Pasadena,] County of Los Angeles, State of California,"
and by which defendants Frank F. Winsell and Mary Winsell, his wife (who are Caucasians), are "enjoined and. re~
,strained from permitting said defendants . . . [Raines],
or any other person not of the Caucasian race, to use, occupy
or live upon said real property prior to the first Jay of
January, 1950."
The Palisades Tract is a subdivision in the city of Pasadena embracing a total of sixty-nine lots, of which thirty-one

820

F ~mCHILD

'I).

RAINES

[24 C.2d

front on Palisade Street (which runs east and 'west) - in the
block between Arroyo Boulevard on the west and Forest
Avenue on the east, and the remaining thirty~eight 16ts front
on the tract boundary streets (Arroyo Boulevard on the west,
Forest Avenue on the east, and Washington Street on the!
south) and are all contiguous to and, either at the side or
the rear, abut upon and adjoinsome one. of the lots fronting
on Palisade Street. At the time of the original subdivision
apparently no racial restrictions were placed on anyo£:, the
property in the tract but in 1927 owners representing thirtyfive (possibly only thirty-three) of the 'sixty-nine Jots in the
tract entered into a contract whereby each signing owner, as.
a covenant running with the land, agreed to restrict the use
and occupancy of the property owned by him, up to the
first day of January, 1950, to persons of the Caucasian race.
It is apparent from the terms of such contract that the
signers intended its restrictive covenants to become effective
as to the several parcels owned by them, respectively, regardless of whether the owners of all or any particular
number or proportion of the lots in the tract joined init and,
hence, the cases of Foster v. Stewart (1933), 134 Cal.App.
482 [25 P.2d 497], and Ober1iJise v. Poulos (1932), 124 Cat
App. 247 [12 P.2d 156] (in which cases it appears that the
contracts by their terms were not intended to become effective until and unless signed by a certain number of property
owners in the affected tracts), are not controlling. Nevertheless, the number and relative locations of the lots covered
and not covered by the agreement are material, as hereinafter appears.
Twenty-eight (possibly twenty-six) of the thirty-one lots
fronting on Palisade Street, seven of the twelve fronting on
Arroyo Boulevard, none of the twelve fronting on Forest
Avenue, and none of the fourteen fronting on' Washington
Street are covered by the contract. In other words, at least
thirty-four lots in the tract are not restricted as to racial
occupation or use. These thirty-four lots comprise three
(possibly five) fronting on Palisade Street, five fronting on
Arroyo Boulevard, twelve (all) fronting on Forest Avenue,
and fourteen (all) fronting on Washington Street. As pre'Viously mentioned all of the lots fronting on Arroyo Boulevard,
Forest Avenue, and Washington Street are contiguous at
some point to a lot fronting on Palisade Street.· The lot in
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controversy (lot' 43) fronts on Palisade Street and adjoins;
on the east, lot 42, which is restricted, and, on the west, the
rear of lots 44 and 45 (fronting on Arroyo Boulevard),
which are not restricted, and the rear of lots 46 and 47,
which are restricted. At its rear it abuts upon lot 48, which
is restricted,' and at its southeast corner touches lot 52
(fronting on Washington Street), whicli is not restricted.
Directly· across Palisade Street from lot 43 is lot 6, which
is restricted ;so also is lot 5, which adjoins lot 6 to the
west, but adjoining a portion (50 feet) of the side of lot
5 is lot 4 (fronting on Arroyo Boulevard at the corner of
Palisade Street), which is not restricted. Lots 1, 2, and
3, .also frontiug on Arroyo Boulevard, likewise adjoin the
eastside of lot 5, and of these lot 3 is restricted but lots 1
and 2 are not· restricted.
Plaintiffs are the owners of certain of the restricted lots
the fallts as to such ownership, as to the execution and recjll t.he traet.
The complaint alleged and the court found
ordation of the restriction agreement, and that as to lot
43 (the lot here involved) the agreement was executed by
the then owners, from whom, by mesne conveyances, defendants Wlnsell acquired title prior to the commencement
(on June 23, 1942) of this action; that "shortly prior to
the commencement of this action, defendants . . . Winsel . . ~ ,being the owners of' lot 43 of, said Palisades
Tract, entered into an agreement with defendants .
Raines, wherein and whereby said
[defendants]
. to sell and convey, and said deWinsell agreed.
fendants . . . Raines agreed • . . to purchase, said
lot No. 43 • . . ; that by the terms and conditions of
.said agreement
[defendants] Winsell retain the
legal title to' said lot 43 until the full purchase price is paid;
that by the terms and conditions of said agreeinent . .'.
; [defendants ] Raines 'Were' permitted to enter into possessiOIi. of, and to use and occupy and live upon said lot No.
43; that said . . . [defendants] Raines did, prior. to the
commencement of this action, enter into possession of, and
ever since have used and occupied and still do use, .occupy
and live upon said lot No. 43"; and that defendants Raines
are of the negro race and their occupation of lot 43 is "con·trary to and in violation of" the race restriction agreement
,.
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and plaintiffs have thereby "been injured and damaged."
As a special defense (third affirmative) defendants allege '''fhat at the time of making said agreement [in the
year 1927] . . . there were no non-Cauccasians using or
occupying property within several blocks of said Palisades
Tract.
That since the execution of said agreement
:md particularly within the last five years, non-Caucasian
occupancy of the premises and in the same tract and block
[italics added] has expanded with increasing frequency so
that at the present time a large porportion of the lots in. the
immediate vicinity and adjoining lots named in said agreement are now occupied. by persons not of the Caucasian
race but of the negro race and as a consequence thereof,
said property is not now as desirable for occupancy by persons of the white or Caucasian race .
; that at the
present time lots 18, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 [which
front on Palisade Street] are adjoined by lots occupied by
persons of the negro race; that defendants are informed and
believe that other lots described in . . . [the agreement]
are adjoined by lots now occupied by persons who are nonCaucasians. . . . That as a result of said change in conditions, the enforcement of said agreement . . . would not
benefit the plaintiffs but would irreparably injure the defendants and the plaintiffs in that the lots in said Palisades
Tract described in
[the agreement] would not be
occupied by persons of the white race and could not be occupied by persons who were non-Caucasians."
[1] In this connection defendants contend that the undisputed evidence introduced in support of the third affirmative defense demonstrates such change in the character of
the surrounding neighborhood (including non-restricted
lots in the same tract) since the making of the race restriction agreement in 1927 as to bring this case as a matter of
law within the oft-applied principle that "equity courts
will not enforce restrictive covenants by injunction in a
case where, by reason of a change in the character of the
surrounding neighborhood, not resulting from a breach of
the covenants, it would be oppressive and inequitable to
give the restriction effect, as where the enforcement of the
covenant would have no other result than to harass or injure
the defendant, without benefiting the plaintiff" (Hurd v.
Albert (1331), 214 Cal. 15, 23 [3 P.2d 545]; see Downs v.
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Kroeger (1927), 200 Cal. 743, 747 [254 P. 1101]; Friesen
v. City of Glendale (1930), 209 Cal. 524, 529 [268 P. 1080] ;
Hess v. Country Club Park (1931),213 Cal. 613, 620 [2 P.2d
782]; Marra v. Aetna Construction Co. (1940), 15 Ca1.2d
375, 378 [101 P.2d 490]), and that therefore the court erred
in granting plaintiffs injunctive relief. Particularly it is
urged that the court erred in failing to make fl.ndings of
fact resolving the issues raised by such affirmative defense.
If such issues are material---.:and we conclude that they areand if there was competent evidence tending to .establish
the affirmative of such issues, it was error not to determine
them by appropriate findings.
It appears from the bill of exceptions that plaintiff Hazel
Fairchild, one of the signers of the race restriction agreement, testified that at the time snch agreement was made
"no colored family lived within several blocks of the restricted area but at the present time there are negro fami-.
lies living on Del Monte street [immediately] north cl
Palisades [the street on which most of the lots included in
the agreement front], on Forrest avenue [immediately]
east, and Washington street [immediately] south of the
restricted area; there are no colored persons living within
the area covered by the . . . agreement except the Haines
family [defendants] on lot 43; £01' the last several ~'ears a
colored family has been living on lot 19 [which is within the
tract and fronts on Palisade Street but is not inchtdpd in
the agreement], which adjoins lot 18 [included ill the agreement] on the east."
One H. P. Hammond, a real estate broker, testified on
behalf of plaintiffs that he had maintainrd his office in Pasadena for "many years"; that "It has been my experience
that invariably when a negro family moves into a neighborhood theretofore occupied by white people, the ,'a.hie of the
surrounding property drops fifty per cent. The fact tbat nrgro
families have moved in and are living on Wasbington street on
lots directly south of Palisades street would cause the same cecrease in realty values." The lots referred to on 'Vashington Street are within the Palisades Tract. Mr. Hammond
was the only witness on the subject of damages by reason of
negro occupancy of premises in the neighborhood and it is
to be noted that his testimony supports the conclusion t.hat
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the Palisades Tract is not damaged by the· occupancy of lot
43 by Mr. and Mrs. Raines; that the damage occasioned that
neighborhood by negro occupancy had already .been sus~
tained by reason of the influx of negroes on Washington
Street in the same tract.
Defendant Ross H. Raines testified· that he and his "family are living in the house on lot 43 . . . ; .that Del Monte
is the name of the street directly north of Palisades street,
and Forrest avenue is directly east, and negro and Mexican
families live along those streets and on lots adjoining the
lots restricted; that a negro family lives across the street
from me down at the end of the block on Jot 19; that there
is no alley between the lots on Palisades .streetand Washington street and several families of negroes live along Washington street on lots that adjoin on the south, lots described
in the race restriction agreement; that the neighborhood,
except the lots described in the race restriction agreement,
is occupied predominantly by negro families."
Edna Griffin, a physician and surgeon, testified on defendants' behalf that "I maintain my office in Pasadena;
I am frmiliar with the Horthwest part of Pasadena and particularly that part wherein is located Palisades, Del Monte,
Forrest and Washington streets; I have patients living on
all those stre~ts upon whom I make professional calls and
those patients are negroes; I know of at least twelve families of negroes living on Washington street immediately south
of Palisades street and west of Forrest; that part of Pasa~
dena is occupied predominantly by negroes and is more suitable for negroes than for white people."
One Sadie Wright, called as a witness by defendants, testified that "I have lived in Pasadena over forty years and
have been familiar with the area wherein is located Palisades, Del Monte, Forrest and Washington streets since it
was an orange grove; that over twenty years ago only white
people lived in that area but at the present time, with the
exception of the lots covered by the race restriction agreement, it is occupied principally by negroes. and is more suitable for the occupaIicy of negroes than of white - people. "
It is thus established .by the testimony of on~ of plaintiffs
themselves-the witness Hazel Fairchild-that since . the
making of the agreement the several restricted parcels haye
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become substantially surrounded, in the same tract and
block, on three sides by negro residents, and by the testi!r.ony of plaintiffs' witness Hammond· that the presence of
negro residents on Washington Street (in the same tract)
effected a decrease in value of plaintiffs' property within the
tract independently of the presence of defendants Raines
on lot 43. The testimony of defendants' witnesses further
tends to establish that the neighborhood, including the very
block in the Palisades Tract in which the restricted property
is located, is now predominantly negro, "more suitable for
negroes than for white people," and that several of the lots
included in the agreement are adjoined by lots on which
negroes reside. Likewise material is the fact that by the
terms of the agreement its restrictive covenants will expire
in a little more than five years from this date.
[2] On behalf of plaintiffs it is contended that the third
affirmative defense and the above epitomized evidence supporting it are entirely immaterial; that under the circumstances related the plaintiffs' right to· injunctive relief is
absolute and that there is no field for the exercise of judicial discretion as to the granting or withholding of such relief. Weare unable to sustain plaintiffs in this contention.
It appears to us that sonnd judicial philosophy demands
that a measure of discretion be permitted the trial court in
the premises. If we were to uphold the view of the plaintiffs that covenants such as those here involved must in any
circumstances be enforced absolutely without regard to the
number or proportion of lots in a tract subjected to the restrictiolls, without consideration of the occupancy and use
of the adjoining property or of the length of time during
which the imposed restrictions are to endure, we would ignore principles of equity which are fundamental. If the
above related circumstances are legally immaterial under
the facts of this cuse, then they would be immaterial if they
showed that only two lots of a tract were restricted although
all others were free and were occupied by colored Americans
and even though only five months or five weeks instead of
dve years remained in the life of the restrictions. We .are
of the view that, subject to certain broad principles, each
case of this character must be determined upon the facts
peculiar to it.
.

826

. ii

FAIRCHILD V. RAINES

[24 C.2d

[3] It is the general rule that the granting or withholding of equitable relief involves the exercise of judicial discretion. (Vesper v. Forest Lawn Oemetery Assn. (1937),
20 Cal.App.2d 157, 163 [67 P.2d 368] ; Diederichsen v. Sutch
(1941), 47 Cal.App.2d 646, 649 [118 P.2d 863].) It is likewise true, as a general rule, that "the equity courts will not
enforce restrictive covenants by injunction in a case where,
by reason of a change in the character of the surrounding
neighborhood, not resulting from a breach of the covenants,
it would be' oppressive and inequitable to give the restriction
effect, as where the enforcement of the covenant would have
no other result than to harass or injure the defendant, without benefiting the plaintiff." (Hurd v. Albert (1931), supra,
214 Cal. 15, 22.) As was said in Trustees of Oolumbia Oollege v. Thacher (1882), 87 N.Y. 311, 317 [41 Am.Rep. 365,
367], "It certainly is not the doctrine of courts of equity, to
enforce, by its peculiar mandate, every contract, in all cases,
even where specific execution is found to be its legal intention
and effect. It gives or withholds such decree according to its
discretion, in view of the circumstances of the case . . .
And so, though the contract was fair and just when made, the
interference of the court. should be denied, if subsequent
events have made performance by the defendant so onerous,
that its enforcement would impose great hardship upon him,
and cause little or no benefit to the plaintiff." (Quoted and
followed in Downs v. Kroeger (1927), supra, 200 Cal. 743,
747; cf. Walker v. Haslett (1919),44 Cal.App. 394, 398, 401
[186 P. 622], wherein, although an injunction was directed,
it was made without prejudice to future modification "because possible future changes in the' condition of the neighborhood may entitle defendant toa modification or even a
dissolution.") Also, as to the duration of restrictions and
their enforcibility it has been said that "the sound course is
. to hold that where the purpose of the restriction can no
longer be carried out the servitude comes to an end; that
the duration of the servitude is determined by its purpose. "
(Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913), 381.)
[4] Plaintiffs emphasize that there had been no change
in "Negro or non-Caucasian occupancy" of the lots included
in the agreement until the occupancy by defendants Raines
of lot 43. This is a material fact admitted by defendants
but it is not necessarily controlling here. In an area as

-------------------
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small as that involved in this case (some thirty-five of the
sixty-nine lots in the entire tract) and where the restricted
lots do not form a single contiguous group, it would not
seem essential that the occupancy of any of such restricted
lots themselves should have undergone the critical change if
it has occurred in the very neighborhood of which they are
a continguous part geographically and, apparently, in social
aspects. Indeed, it is obvious that a change in the race
character of the neighborhood, without violation of the cove-'
nants of the agreement, could occur only through a change
in the occupancy of neighboring lots not included in the
agreement. (See Downs v. Kroeger (1927), supra~ 200 Cal.
743; cf. Jewett v. Albin (1928), 90 Cal.App. 535, 543, 546
[266 P. 329].)
The contention of plaintiffs that the proposition of law
declared in the case of Downs v. Kroeger, supra (a restric,:
tion against other than residential use), has no application
to a race restriction case cannot be sustained. (SeeLetteau
v. Ellis (1932), 122 Cal.App. 584, 588 [10 P.2d 496].) It
is, of course, true that race restriction agreementS as to the
use and occupancy of real property are normally. r~cognized
as valid (Los Angeles Investment 00." v. Gary (1919), 181
Cal. 680, 683-684 [186 P. 596, 9 A.L.R. 115]) and'~Iiforcible
by injunction (Wayt v. Patee (1928), 205 Ca146,49~50
[269 P. 660]). It is also true that where. all, or perhaps.
substantially all, of the continguous lots of a tract of substantial extent are subject to race restrictions the courts
should not fail to enforce the covenants as to the restricted'
area merely because surrounding property eventually is put
to the use and occupation prohibited to the' restricted area.
(See Porter v. Johnson (1938), 232 Mo.App. 1150, 1158
[115 S.W.2d 529].) Obviously the precise purpose of the covenants is to avert changes in the restricted territory, not in:
the surrounding neighborhood, and they can have no legal
efficacy beyond the area of the tract to which they are applicable. The mere fact that a change in the character of the
use of neighboring property may make free use of restricted
property more profitable does not warrant failure to enforce
the restriction "if the original purpose of the covenant can.
still be realized." (Marra v. Aetna Oonstruction 00. (1940),
supra, 15 Cal.2d 375, 378, a building restriction case.)

,"",
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[5]:Here the third aftlrmativedefense places before the
trial court the question as to whether the original purpose
of the restrictive covenant can still be realized by the owners
of the lots which front upon Palisade Street. The fact that
all the lots in the tract are not subject to the covenant is not
conclusive of the issue. Even if restrictions are not enforcible as to every lot in an area originally covered by an agreement they may be upheld as to a part of that area if such part
is of sufficient extent and so located that the original purpose
of the restrictions can be accomplished. (Downs v. Kroeger (1927), supra, 200 Cal. 743, 749.)
On behalf of plaintiffs emphasis has been placed on the
case of Grady v. Garland (1937), (U.S.C.A.,D.C.), 89 F.2d
817 [67 App.D.C. 73]. That case, however, not only fails
to sustain the proposition that the right of plaintiffs to an
injunction is absolute but rather tends to lend support to our
view that an exercise of judicial discretion is involved.
Plaintiffs there sought to quiet their title to six of a group
of eight adjoining lots as against a covenant as to each of
the eight lots that "said lot shall never be rented, leased,
sold, transferred or conveyed unto any negro or colored
Upon
person under a penalty of two thousand dollars."
the pleading itself the complaint was dismissed. The court
said (at p. 818): "While it is true that the averments of
the bill are admitted by the motion to dismiss, we think the
bill wholly fails to allege facts sufficient to justify the granting of the relief sought. The bill merely alleges, in effect,
that by reason of the occupancy by colored persons of the
territory immediately west of the property in question, plaintiffs' property has been damaged and that it could not result
in damage to the defendants to have the restriction removed.
These are merely conclusions, not supported by any facts alleged in the bill, since there are no averments to the effect that
the property has been rendered less valuable for rental purposes or for sale, or that the character of the environment
would make it unfit or unprofitable for use by the enforcement
of the restriction, or that a material change has occurred in
the environment since plaintiffs acquired title to their respective properties-all of which are fact.., important to be considered in an action for the removal of the restri4tion." The
facts recited in the quoted statement distinguish that case
from the one at bar. '1'he facts enumerated as "important to
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be considered in an action for the removal of the restriction,"
which facts were not averred in the complaint there, are, in
substance, the very facts which are alleged in the third
affirmative defense here and which plaintiffs assert are immaterial.
In the Grady case, supra, the court further said (at p.819) :
"It might be that under such circumstances [where the matters complained of were foreign to the grounds on which the
restriction was based] surrounding conditions would be sufficient to justify the removal of the restriction, but the restriction here is against the disposal of the property in question
to colored people, and the complaint now is that colored people are living in the adjoining neighborhood [italics added],
to the damage of these complainants. The restriction is for
the protection of the property to which it applies, and is not
affected by similar conditions which may arise in adjoining
property. Castleman v. Avignone, 56 App.D.C. 253,12 F.2d
326. The object of the restriction here was to prevent the
invasion of the restricted property by colored people, not
the invasion of property surrounding it.
"If the facts here alleged were sufficient in equity to justify
the setting aside of the covenant of restriction, all that would
be necessary to defeat such a covenant would be the settlement of a few colored families in the immediate vicinity of the
restricted areas. . . .
"A mere glance at the present situation demonstrates the
protection which the restriction is to the defendants . . .
It furnishes a complete barrier against the eastward movement of colored population into the restricted area-a dividing line."
But in the case before us there is no "complete barrier."
Upon the evidence introduced it appears that not only the
"surrounding neighborhood" but the very tract and block
of which the restricted lots are a part has been invaded. As
previously set out the witness Sadie Wright testified-and
she was not disputed-in reference to the entire Palisades
Tract "that over twenty years ago only white people lived
in that area but at the present time, with the exception of
the lots covered by the race restriction agreement, it is occupied principally by negroes and is more suitable for the
occupancy of negroes than of white people." Since the
lots covered by the agreement are not a contiguous group
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and do not constitute a complete barrier or dividing line as
to any whole tract or block or other well-defined area or
neighborhood, and since lot 43 (the mooted lot) is adjoined
on one side by two unrestricted lots and is otherwise situated as hereinbefore described, it is onr conclusion that the
record cannot be held to establish an absolute right in plaintiffs to the injunction against the use and occupancy of the
mentioned lot· by defendants Raines. The failure of the
trial court to specifically find on the issues raised by the
third affirmative' defense therefore becomes material.
[6] The only finding of the trial court directed to the
issues raised by such special defense is that "As to the
allegations of.
[such defense], the court finds that
since 1927 negro and Mexican occupancy of properties has
increased near or in the vicinity of the lots described in said
race restriction agreement, but that there has been no change
in negro occupancy as to any of the lots described in said
race restriction agreement, except the occupancy complained
of in this action." Such finding, in the light of the more
specific allegations of the defense, and of the evidence tending to support those allegations, is not adequate and, hence,
does not establish that plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctive relief granted.
[7] Where a trial court makes findings upon all essential ultimate facts it is not error to fail to find upon evidential matters (see Williams v. Mf}Dowell (1939), 32 Cal.App.
2d 49, 52 [89 P.2d 155] ; Ryan v. San Diego Elec. Ry. 00.
(1942), 52 Cal.App.2d 460, 464 [126 P.2d 401]) but this
rule is not applicable in an 'equity ~mit where probative facts,
which are material to the exercise of sound judicial discretion in the premises, and which may be sufficient to constitute a defense against the relief sought, are pleaded and are
supported by competent evidence. Since, under such circumstances, the probative facts as pleaded in themselves
constitute material issues, the rule stated in James v. Haley
(1931),212 Cal. 142, 147 [297 P. 920], is controlling: "Ever
sinee the adoption of the codes, it has been the rule that
findings are required on all material issues raised by the
pleadings and evidence, unless they are waived, and if the
court renders judgment without making findings on all material issues, the case must be reversed." (See also Kr-wm
v. Malloy (1943), 22 Cal.~d 132, 136 [137 P.2d 18].)
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For the reasons hereinabove stated the judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and
Carter, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. In my opinion
the findings of the trial conrt fail not only to provide an
adequate' basis for determining whether enforcement of the
restriction in the light of changed conditions would impose
great hardship upon the defendants with little or no benefit
to the plaintiffs (Trustees of Oolumbia Oollege v. Thacher,
87 N.Y. 311, 317 [41 Am.Rep. 365, 367]), but to consider
whether enforcement would be contrary to the public interest
in the use of land in urban communities where people are
concentrated in limited areas.
The public policy against restricting the free use of land
finds expression in the rule that an instrument creating an
equitable servitude must be strictly construed and any doubts
resolved in favor of the free use of the land. (Werner v.
Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 181 [183 P. 945]; Marra v. Aetna
Oonstruction 00., 15 Cal.2d 375, 378 [101 P.2d 490].) Again,
building restrictions imposed by private agreement between
landowners cannot stand in the way of the' pliblic interest.
Thus in Friesen v. Oity of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524 [268 P.
1080], covenantors entitled to the restrictive use of land
were denied compensation for its use as a public street on
the ground that the interest under a restrictivecovenatl~
"is not a property right, but is a contractual right cognizable
in equity as between the contracting parties, not binding on
the sovereign contemplating a public use of the particular
property taken." (209 Cal. 524, 531; see 19 Cal.L.Rev. 58).
In Sackett v. Los Angeles Oity School Dist., 118 Cal.App.
254 [5 P.2d 23], the court held that a schoo~ district was
not bound by a covenant restricting the use of lots to resj~ .
dential purposes, but was free to use the land for school
playground purposes. The court stated, "the state and,its
various political subdivisions may not be bound by the terms
of a private contract to which it was not a party (United
States v. Oertain Lands, 112 F. 622; Doan v. Cleveland Short
Line Ry 00., 92 Ohio St. 461 [112 N.E. 505]; Friesen v.·
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C~ty-ofGiendale; supra). Public policy
been den~mi.
naiedavague and uncertain guide at best (Miller & Lux v.
Madera Canal etc. Co., 155 Cal. 59 [22 L.R.A. N. S. 391., 99
P. 502]), but instances arise that call for its application.
The present action is one that does. It presents the situation of an agency of the state created for the sole purpose of
providing adequate educational facilities for the youth of a
certain limited area against whom there is sought to be invoked the aid of equity to enforce a restriction created by the
provisions of a private contract to which the state was in
nowise a party and by which it neither expreesly nor by
necessary implication consented to be bound. The state may
not be thus hampered in carrying out a purpose in which
it is so vitally interested." (118 Cal.App. 254, 258.) In
Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15 [3 P.2d 545], a tract restricted
to residential purposes became enclosed in a business district
as the city of Los Angeles developed. The public interest
in the development of the city rendered the agreement unemorceable, even though its beneficiaries retained some interest in its emorcement. In Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal.App.
584, 588 [10 P.2d 496], the court held that a restriction
against occupancy of land by persons of negro descent was
unenforceable because of changed conditions, stating: "We
find it needless to follow appellants' arguments on the technical rules and distinctions made between conditions, covenants and mere restrictions . . . A principle of broad
public policy has intervened to the extent that modern progress is deemed to necessitate a sacrifice to many former
claimed individual rights. The only obstacle met has been
the rule of property or as termed the disinclination to disturb vested property rights. To some extent this, too, has
yielded in the sense that many rights formerly labeled as
p:r:operty rights by a process of academic relation are now
considered merely personal and have been SUbjected to the
common good." (See also, Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N.Y.
243 [104 N.E. 629]; Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co. Inc.,
244 N.Y. 22 [154 N.E. 652] ; 14 Columb.L.Rev. 438; 3 Tiffany,
Real Property (1939) 522.)
In the present case there is a public interest in the congestion .of the limited residential districts for colored people.
Tllat congestion is a consequence of residential segregation
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flf the coloreJ popu1:ltion acconplishedj
by ordi~ances,
w~lich w~uld be U1!COl:stituti(oDal (Buchanan v. Warley, 2-15
U K 60· [3~ S.Ot. 16, 62 L.Ell, 149, 210 Ann;Cas.191 RK
1201]; IIarmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 6~::) [47 S.Ct.471, 71 L.Ed.
e31]; City of Richmond v. De(lns, 37 F.2il 7i2, atr'd 281 .
U.S. 704 [50 S.Ot. 4.07, 74 L.EJ. 112S]; City of Dallas v.
Liberty Anne.:: Corp. (Tcx.Civ.Apl'.), 19 S.\v;2d 845; see
16 C.J.S. 1474; HU:ltilll;, The Constitutionality of Race Distinction-s and the Baltimore Negro SeGregation Ordinanoe,
11 Coltunb.L.Hev. 23; Minor, Constitutionality af Segregation Ordtnc/fI,ces, 18 Va.L.nev. 561; Benson, Segregation
Ordi1l.lmces, 1 Vn.L.Rev.(l';.s') 330; Mangnm, The Le!!,al Status of t!le Negro, p. 138 et &eq.), but by ngreCl:lents between
private persohs, which t.1.e courts have recog!lized· as valid.
(Corri!jtt;n v. Duc;rcley, 271 U.S. 323 [46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.EJ.
9C9]; Los Al'geles Inv. Co. v. Gary, rn Cal.CSO [186 P.
59€, 9 A.L.R. 115] ; Jenss Inv. Co. v. Walden, 196 Cal. 753
[239 P. 34]; Qucensborou:Jh Lend Co. v. Ct:ze:Jux, 131) La.
72-1 [67 So. 641, Ann.C:ls.131GD 1248, L.R.A.1nGB 1201];
r~rmalee v. Morris, 21':; Mich. 625 [188 X.W. 330, 3B
_A.L.R. 1180]; Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373 [206 N.W.
5~2, 42 A.L.U. 1267] ; United C001Jerctive Realty Co. v. Hawk.
ins, 2(:9 Ky. 563 [108 S.W.2d 507] ; sec Bruce, Rccial Zoning
by Pn'Cl'Jto Contract in the Ught of the COllstitution and the
Rule _1:;:li11st llcsirllhlt on Alic1tation, 21 IlLJ.J.Hcv. 704; Martk, Se(Jregation of Negroes, 32 Mich.L.Rev. 721; 23 Cal.L.
Rev. 361; Mangum, op. cit. p. 147; ct. Gandolfo v. Ha,rtman,
4!J F. 181 [16 L.R.A. 277] ; Rutledge, J., concurring in H1t'ndky v. Gorewitz, 132 F.2d 23, 25.)
The problem of race segregation cannot be soh-eJ by the
courts alone, for it involves emotions and connrfions too
deeply imbedded ill the social outlook of men to be uprooted
oVl'rnight by judicial pronouut!cments. Nevert~el!.'ss the
problem must be confronted step by step, however prO'l,i-·
sional the solution, with rl'g'ard both for t~c int!.'rests of mi.
llOrity p-oups and the general public interl·st. It D.a:;t be
rec')gnizcd that the stea,iy m~~ration ",r southern :leh'r"('s
a:1,J the influx of ncg1"':'('S in1;A> urban OO! l:::lu:!iticO in rl:S?, ::se
to the incrcllsing uCl!lnn~ls of in lustry !l.r lah...r, t ..gct~cr
with race scgregation (s,ee KentlOtty, The Ne.,--ro Pt,as:mt
TUr'-1s City-ward, eh. II, The Causes of Migratiun, p. 41;
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Woofter, Negro Problems in Citie~, ch. II, The Rapid city
Growth, p. 26; Sterner, The Negro's Share, A Study of Income, Consumption, Housing, and Public ASMstanee, pp. 186209; Martin, Segregation of Negroes, 32 Mich.L.Rev. 721),
have made it impossible for many negroes to find decent
housing in large centers of population. The report of the
Committee on Negro Housing of the President's Conference
on Home Building and Home Ownership (1932) page 3,
states: "Cities of the North . . . have shown increases
rangin~ from 10 to 600 per cent. Chicago's Negro population in 1910 was 44,103; in 1930 it had increased to 233,903.
Philadelphia's increased from 84,459 in 1910 to 219,599 in
1930, and that of New York . . . from 91,709 to 327,706."
In recent years there has been a large negro migration into
Southern California. The census of 1940 shows an increase
of the colored population of Los Angeles from 67,348 in 1930
to 97,847 (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1942,
78th Congress, 1st Sess., House Document No. 53, p. 29),
and the war has accelerated the pace of this migration.
Negroes migrating into urban communities have found
barriers at every turn. "Segregation . . . has kept the
Negro-occupied sections of cities throughout the country fatally unwholesome places, a. menace to the health, morals and
~eneral decency of cities, and 'plague spots for race exploitation, friction and riots.' " (Report of the Committee on
Negro Housing of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home O,vnership, pp. 45 and 46.) The choice lies
between the continuation of such conditions and the expansion of urban negro districts. Race restriction agreements,
undertaking to do what the state cannot, must yield to the
public interest in the sound development of the whole community. The courts, as the agencies of the state confronted
with the problem of enforcing racial zoning by private agreements, must consider all of the factors that affect the public
interest. It is pertinent to recall the words of Judge Cardozo
in his concurring opinion in Adler v. Deegan, ~1 N.Y. 467,
484 [167 N.E. 705, 711]: "The Multiple Dwelling Act is
aimed at many evils, but most of all it is n measure to eradIcate the slum. It seeks to bring about conditions whereby
healthy children shall be born, and healthy men and women
reared, in the dwellings of the great metropolis. To have
such men a,nd W<'>IIlen is n<.>t a city concern IIlerely. It is the
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concern of the whole state. Here is to be bred the citizenry
with which the State must do its work in the ycars that are
to come. The end to be achieved is more than the avoidance
of pestilence or contagion. The end to be achieved is the
quality of men and women . . . If the moral. and physical
fibre of its manhood and womanhood is not a State concern,
.
the question is, what is Y"
In the present case a residential district populated by
colored people now surrounds the restricted area on three
sides. The question whether the restricted area shall stand
as a. barrier against expansion of the negro district cannot
be determined entirely by findings with regard to property
values and the interests of property owners. It is also necessary to determine whether maintenance of. this barrier
would deprive the colored population of any feasible access
to additional housing and compress it within the inflexible
boundaries of its present district at the risk of a congestion
whose evils would inevitably burst the bounds of that district.
The trial court should therefore be directed to make findings
as to the housing facilities available in the district occupied
by the colored population and to determine whether there
is a need for additional housing that would justify an expansion of the district by absorption of the restricted area.
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